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(b) Tables 2, 4 [not printed in the Record]: The evidence does not indicate whether the mediated effect is cell death, cell metabolic injury, cell competitive inhibition, or simply cell starvation. It merely demonstrates an overall sucrose effect. It may be nothing more than either the lack of the proper level of a metabolite or nutritive, or the generation of a competitive antimetabolite. The model the authors chose is unfortunately one that is notably sensitive to minimal nutritional or hormonal imbalances. A mere interplay among the nutrients in the medium may cause identical results. These cells are not inherently ever-dividing or ever-growing cells. They are cells that in situ will differentiate and soon become resting or functional cells. Hence, a physiological shift that is artificially induced would render such cells particularly exacting metabolically and particularly sensitive to minimal hormonal or nutritional changes. The stimulant effect at lower radiation level suggests the generation of a useful intermediate (nutrilit or hormone like) at that level. It also supports the concept that the whole phenomenon may be attributed to the upsetting of a delicate hormonal or nutritional balance. The substrate-mediated effect was inhibitory only toward cell division, whereas the cells continued to enlarge, namely to exercise a vast biosynthetic cell machinery, a further support to the concept of a peculiarly delicate nutritional or hormonal balance.

(c) Tables 3, 5 [not printed in the Record]: The negative response of the 7- and 10-day cultures is further evidence supporting the nutritional concept. It does also emphasize the differential cytological and/or metabolic traits among even the same cells of the same progeny, only a few days older. It is another reason to exercise caution in extrapolating this difference toward the ultimate complexity of a mammalian system.

(d) Table 6 [not printed in the Record]: Provides further support that the irradiated sucrose-mediated effect may be mere inhibition of cell division. Lines 2 and 4 project two apparently similar cells (see cells/ugm and ugm/cell), only the former being incapable of division. The authors have not noted or explained why the inhibited cell in this case has not enlarged in contrast with effects mediated by irradiated total basal medium or coconut milk (tables 2, 4). There is no evidence to show that the authors attempted to determine the mode of the sucrose-mediated effect. How would fresh inocula preexposed to irradiated sucrose or explants from line 2 behave, if washed and resuspended in the normal basal medium? This simple addition would show whether the cells were permanently intoxicated or simply inhibited or deprived. The authors could have also sought this fact in a simple conventional competitive inhibition experiment.

(e) Table 7 [not printed in the Record]: It is not clear whether the authors have accounted for the effect of pH and Eh that are admittedly drastically changed by irradiation and/or heating. Neither is it clear whether the authors accounted for the effect of autoclaving sucrose alone versus autoclaved in basal medium.

(f) It is not evident whether the authors have attempted a very simple and a very direct microscopic examination of the carrot cells in their model system to hunt for so-called cytological abnormalities or chromosomal aberrations. The carrot system provides all cellular stages in free living or intact cells.

(g) In the Tradescantia microspore experiment the reported evidence for a specific effect is not apparent. The chromosomal abnormalities could have been equally induced by multitudes of other simple environmental factors, again related only to the specific cytochemical makeup of such cells. A simple case of ionic imbalance or

hypo- or hyper-tonicity may very well induce such changes. However, the important question still remains unanswered: Is it all damage, inhibition, or deprivation?

(h) As to table 9, this is truly not compatible with careful scientific work. The authors state that the data are derived from an undergraduate class in cytological techniques.

(i) The data in table 10 demonstrate that irradiated sucrose had no significant effect on sex-linked lethal mutation rate, as admitted by the authors.

The authors have not done a thorough job in searching the literature insofar as it might yield clues as to the active component formed by radiation. Reference is made to work published by Goldblith, *Science*, volume 109, page 519, 1949; "Advances in Food Research," volume 3, pages 180-196, published by Academic Press, 1951; Pigman and Goepf, 1948, in "Chemistry of the Carbohydrates," pages 69-70, published by Academic Press of New York; Singh, et al, *Journal of American Chemical Society*, volume 70, pages 517-522, 1948; Wolfson, Binkley, and McCabe, *Journal American Chemical Society*, volume 81, page 1442, 1959; M. A. Khenokh, *Zhurnal Obshchei Khimii*, volume 11, 776 (1941); volume 17, 1024 (1947); volume 20, 1560 (1950); M. A. Khenokh, *Doklady Akad. Nauk S.S.S.R.*, volume 104, No. 5 746 (1955); Trudy, 1st All-Union Conference on Radiation Chemistry, 1958 (p. 188); M. A. Khenokh, "Dissertatsiya" (Ph. D. thesis), Leningrad, 1959 (p. 44).

These references are being used as a basis of chapter 6, titled "Effect of Ionizing Radiation on Carbohydrates," published in the Russian book, "Radiation Biochemistry," pages 89-97, by A. M. Kuzin, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of Biophysics, Moscow 1962.

Based on the authors' ultraviolet absorption curves showing that the active component or components absorb strongly from 260 to 290 mμ, the literature articles suggest that the active component from irradiated sugar may be 5-hydroxymethylfurfuraldehyde, levulinic acid, or dihydroxyacetone. The absorption spectra found by Khenokh are identical with those reported in nature by Holsten et al.

Among the products of sucrose breakdown by radiation reported in the literature are the following: fructose, glucose, glucosone, D-glucurone, D-gluconic acid, D-arabinose, dihydroxyacetone, glyoxal, and formaldehyde.

Berry et al have attributed the in vitro cytotoxic effect of carbohydrate solutions irradiated to sterilizing doses to the production of glyoxal. The same authors implicate the in vitro cytotoxic effect of autoclaved sugar to one of the short-lived precursors of hydroxymethylfurfural. They caution against the wanton extrapolation of these findings to the intact animal.

The article by Holsten et al consists of six pages each containing two columns of very fine print. In the entire article only three sentences (lines 4-9 and lines 24-30 on the right hand column of page 855) refer to radiation sterilization of foods. The speculations embodied in these three sentences are totally unconnected with the experimental portion of the paper; they ignore all published work on wholesomeness of irradiated foods. The very work which the authors state must be done before there is widespread use of radiation sterilized foods with high-sugar content has been completed. The results of this work using mammals as test organisms show that there was a complete absence of occurrences postulated by the authors. There is massive literature based upon direct feeding studies in higher animals indicating safety in consuming irradiated foods. The article by Holsten et al would have little or no scientific bearing on this issue whatsoever save for the publicity it has received in the press.

## REVIEW OF A RESEARCH PAPER

DECEMBER 30, 1965.

Holsten Sugli, and Stewart in their paper, "Direct and Indirect Effects of Radiation on Plant Cells" (*Nature* 208: 850-856, 1965), have concluded that irradiated sucrose is detrimental to the growth and development of carrot-tissue explants.

They suggest, therefore, that irradiated foods, particularly those which contain sugars, may be unwholesome for human consumption. This suggestion is not supported by the published data which have resulted from exhaustive animal feeding studies with foods which were irradiated to 5.6 Mrads with Co<sup>60</sup> or 10 Mev. electrons. Twenty-one such treated foods were fed for 2 years or four generations to rats, dogs, monkeys, and mice. Of these 21 foods, 3 were very high in sugar content: canned peaches in heavy sucrose sirup, pineapple jam and sweetpotatoes.

It is known that irradiation either directly or indirectly through free radical production can alter or bind essential nutrients. The authors of the paper in question made no attempt to determine the nutritional adequacy of their irradiated diet. This irradiation effect can be important if essential nutrients were present in suboptimal amounts.

While irradiation degradation products may be absorbed by a simple cell, extensive studies in mammalian species did not provide data to support that gastrointestinal adsorption or internal accumulation of these products occurred. Furthermore, the higher animals have a remarkable capability to detoxify and destroy foreign or unwanted chemical compounds.

Radiomimetic effects such as those described by the authors have been reported in root tips from wheat and other plants. Adverse effects such as chromosomal aberrations and mutations have been produced by irradiated water, electrolysis, irradiated and nonirradiated cooking oils, as well as by a nonirradiated standard plant growth medium.

The reported radiomimetic effect of water on root tips is important from the standpoint of relating radiomimetic effects in plant cells to animal cells. Since all of the irradiated foods contained large amounts of water, unwholesome effects should have been readily observed in the irradiated food feeding studies.

Irradiation inactivated Hela cells have been successfully used as feeders for the subsequent growth and reproduction of single-cell plants of Hela cells in a nutritionally deficient medium. Toxic products, if formed in the irradiated feeder cells, are not transmitted to the new cell plants.

Summary: The authors of this article have concluded that their work has obvious implications for the radiation sterilization of foods program, especially in those cases in which the irradiated material is relatively rich in sugar. However, published data which have resulted from exhaustive long-term animal feeding studies conducted with 21 different foods, including 3 substances with a very high sugar content, have revealed no deleterious effects.

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#### WHY THE POUND IS WEAK

(Mr. SCHNEEBELI (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SCHNEEBELI. Mr. Speaker, the *Times* of London recently published its analysis of the many reasons why Britain is becoming increasingly involved in fiscal difficulties. This self-analysis is penetrating and certainly has created a sharp impact on public opinion. It seems that we, too, can learn from some of the plain spoken language and critical observations of Britain's excesses.

[From the *London Times*, Mar. 10, 1966]

#### WHY THE POUND IS WEAK

"The economists and financial technicians have their own learned and to themselves no doubt lucid reasons why the pound is weak in the markets of the world. For the ordinary reader they can be stated much more simply.

"The pound is weak—

Because Britain is living beyond her means.

Because neither the Labor government nor the Bank of England nor the British people overcame the crisis a year ago; the foreign lenders did so.

Because Britain is still so heavily in debt abroad.

Because Government spending abroad goes on rising.

Because no Government has the courage to face the British people with the truth.

Because the world sees Mr. George Brown's union—the largest in the country—defying the system on which the Government's economic policy rests.

Because the "trial" by workers in Oxfordshire of some of their fellows who refused to join them in an unofficial strike is regarded as symptomatic.

Because full employment has led unions to overuse their powers and employers to underuse their labor.

Because British industry has continuously lost its share of world markets.

Because whenever the mildest deflation begins to work, it is discontinued before it can even half finish its job.

Because extra leisure is put before extra effort by too many people in all classes.

Because too many working hours are turned into gambling hours.

Because money is regarded by too many people of all classes as something to be got or won rather than earned.

Because under present conditions the trade unions are responsible to no one, and no government has been prepared to bring them under reasonable control.

Because the world knows that the trade unions know this.

Because the Labor government is showing it has learned nothing; it has committed itself, if returned, to proceed with the irrelevance of nationalizing steel.

Because if a conservative government is returned after a so short a spell of opposition, the workers are likely to resume their class warfare.

Because Britain, never having been defeated, still refuses to see she is up against it.

Because the world fears that devaluation will ultimately be chosen as an alternative to deflation, and the world knows this will not solve Britain's long-term problem.

Because while France, Germany, and Italy have had their "economic miracles," Britain has as yet not shown the willingness or the capacity to make the effort to achieve her own "miracle."

Because in all too many cases Britain loves the old instead of the new, seeks reasons not to do things rather than to do them.

Because too many managements have been supine or unimaginative.

Because the change from privilege to talent has been too slow in all too many board rooms.

Because there is on both sides of industry still too much hankering after restriction and too little eagerness for competition.

Because in the last analysis economics is a matter of human nature and not of formulas; no country can be saved if its people will not save themselves.

Because for 20 years leadership has been lacking; soft words have been substituted for hard facts; exhortation has never been followed by deeds; rights have come before responsibilities; the national philosophy has been all take and no give.

Because the world knows that, however slow the descent, the abyss is still at the end of the road.

The pound could be strong if the British people had the ears to hear, the eyes to see, and the will to recover their native sense and energy. They have done it time and again in wars; why can they not do it just once in peace? This is what the general election should be about.

#### SHOE PRICE HIKES PROVE FOLLY OF HIDE EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

(Mr. LANGEN (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LANGEN. Mr. Speaker, the administration's shabby treatment of the U.S. cattle hide industry, performed in the name of forestalling a rise in the prices of leather shoes, has now been stripped of its credibility. I refer you to a story published in yesterday's *Wall Street Journal* that the Nation's shoe manufacturers are raising prices an average of 5 percent on their fall lines of shoes for men and women.

I was particularly interested in the statement by an official of one big shoe company who said that the hide market

can go down to even lower levels and the price of shoes would still go up. In fact, he said that "regardless of the cost of hides, the price of shoes must go up to maintain already low industry profit margins."

It is now obvious that the shoe industry planned to raise prices anyway, which casts a grave shadow over the Commerce Department action on March 11 that established quotas for the export of U.S. cattle hides for the purpose of lowering the price of hides.

It has been almost 2 weeks since I joined with a number of our colleagues in protesting the Commerce Department action. The White House was quick to note my opposition to the export controls on American hides and promptly sent me a memorandum from the Council of Economic Advisers, dated March 17, 1966, defending the action. Let me quote from it:

This action (controlling exports of hides to roll back prices) will prevent a substantial rise in shoe prices.

Shoe producers assured us they would cooperate in holding down prices.

Asking hide producers to forgo a temporary windfall in order to hold down a rise in shoe prices is fully justified.

Increases in hide and leather prices would have forced an increase in shoes prices of 5 percent or more.

It should now be obvious, Mr. Speaker, even to the Council of Economic Advisers, that the shoe industry had no intention of holding down prices, and that the price of leather had little if anything to do with their plans to increase the price of a pair of shoes by \$1 to \$2. The big fuss over controlling the export of hides to provide lower leather prices here at home was merely a smokescreen when you consider there is only about 70 cents' worth of leather in a pair of shoes.

The Commerce Department should promptly rescind the hide export restrictions in light of the obvious facts. It is time for this Government to abandon its deliberate efforts to reduce farm income. And that is exactly what has happened in too many cases, not only in the restrictions on hides, but in Commodity Credit Corporation sales of Government stocks and other income-limiting devices.

#### NO LETUP ON UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. CONSULAR PACT

(Mr. BRAY (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, there still are some few voices in Congress who, despite the macabre Newcomb Mott case, the current "hate America" propaganda from Moscow, and the Russian military and economic backing of the Red totalitarian regime in Hanoi, would have us appease Moscow with a Senate ratification of the Consular Treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The logic of this position is most difficult to fathom.

Even if one were to assume the non-existence of these events and conditions,

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there are many other solid and deeper reasons why this poorly contrived pact should not be ratified by the Senate during this session in the 90th Congress, or ever. We have been fortunate that since June 1964, when this pact was signed, nationwide organizations such as the National Captive Nations Committee, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and several others have conducted educational drives to inform our citizens of the absurdities and dangers of this treaty.

Regardless of any expedient postponement of action on the pact, this educational campaign must be continued so that the fallacious and self-defeating contents of the treaty will receive maximum public understanding and evaluation. A very thorough analysis of the treaty and the circumstances surrounding it has been made by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, of Georgetown University, in a pamphlet, titled "Ten Reasons Against the United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Treaty." Every Member of Congress received this compact study at the start of this session. I commend it to every interested and alert citizen. Because some occasion in the future may be seized upon to appease the imperio-colonialist Russians further by railroading this ill-conceived treaty through the Senate, I wish that this analysis be printed in full text in the permanent RECORD, followed by a popular interest example from the Arizona Republic:

TEN REASONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. CONSULAR TREATY

(By Lev E. Dobriansky)

There are 10 solid reasons why the U.S. Senate should emphatically not ratify the United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Treaty which the Committee on Foreign Relations reported out favorably last August. Most of these reasons were scarcely touched upon in the somewhat superficial public discussion that was precipitated by the committee's sudden action. This condition, however, should be no cause for wonderment. Since the signing of this second treaty of Moscow on June 1, 1964, every attempt has been made to keep the convention out of the arena of public discussion as much as possible.<sup>1</sup>

When the consummate attempt was made to railroad this seemingly innocuous pact through the Senate, numerous legislators and organizations joined in a strong protest against its blind ratification. Interestingly enough, some of the press distorted this fact into some sort of rightwing opposition. One paper, for example, painted it in terms of a deluge of letters inspired by the "Liberty Lobby and other rightwing organizations," though these groups expressed themselves marginally and in the final phase of last summer's episode.<sup>2</sup> An editorial in another organ supporting the treaty observed with guarded overtones, "most of the opposition seems to be made up of organized letter-writing members of such ultraconservative groups as the John Birch Society and the Liberty Lobby."<sup>3</sup> Employing this same smear tactic, a third proponent of the convention showed little esteem for the general intelli-

gence of the Senate when it recklessly charged that the Senate was scared off by the Liberty Lobby which "saw to it that the Senators were bombarded with protest letters."<sup>4</sup>

Anyone who has followed closely the developments surrounding the treaty even before it was signed, cannot but view such reporting and editorializing as crassly inaccurate and misleading. As early as March 1964, the National Captive Nations Committee publicly opposed this pact, 3 months before it was signed in Moscow.<sup>5</sup> In June of that year several national ethnic organizations declared their opposition to the pact. When a number of Senators and others joined this growing chorus of bipartisan protest to the pact's ratification, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee decided not to consider the convention until the next Congress.

With the new 89th Congress in being for its 1st session, periodic inquiries were made as to the scheduling of open, public hearings on the treaty. Some serious discussion of it was being fostered by interested parties.<sup>6</sup> The consistent reply given to the inquiries was that no hearings were as yet being set.<sup>7</sup> As late as July the same position was maintained.<sup>8</sup> In that month, however, citizen groups observing the seventh Captive Nations Week observance throughout the Nation registered their strong opposition to the treaty, and again the call was raised for public hearings. At about this time it was announced that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had authorized the chairman to schedule public hearings.<sup>9</sup> The now-on-now-off treatment caused one committee member to assert that this latest action came "as a complete surprise to me."

Contrary to the quoted press reports and editorials, the opposition to the treaty was markedly cross sectional, including liberals as well as conservatives, Democrats as well as Republicans. Objectively speaking, the reasons offered by so-called ultra-right-wing groups should be evaluated on their own merits rather than substituting for them labels of invidious distinction. The same rule in objective reasoning would apply to any stand taken by their counterparts on the left. Moreover, what was not generally known about the 1964 summer episode was the quiet effort of a concerned Congressman who appraised 57 Senators of the defects in the treaty and even threatened to have the House Foreign Affairs Committee conduct open and fair hearings on the issue.

Examples of the replies to the Congressman's initiative make for perspicacious reading. Thanking him for his critical observations, one Senator adds, "I have not as yet had an opportunity to study this treaty carefully, but my present inclination is to vote against it." Another prominent Senator states, "You find me in complete agreement with your views on this most important subject. It is my intention not only to vote against the convention when it is considered by the Senate but to do all that I can to persuade others to vote against it." Concerning the critical material given him, a third Senator reflects the aroused interest of scores of others in the Senate when he comments, "It will help me to better evaluate

the treaty when it comes up for a vote in the Senate."

These facts should be adequate to convince one of the slanted reporting indulged in by a few newspapers that clamored for the treaty's ratification without even open and fair public hearings on the issue. Evidently, they were stunned by the outcome last August and had no other recourse but to wade in the muck of invidious labelism. Now for the 10 reasons.

# I. NO PUBLIC HEARINGS

Viewing this whole development in all its aspects, any objective observer would have to conclude that the deliberate attempt to preclude open, public hearings on the issue is cause enough for the rejection of the convention. Every significant treaty requiring Senate ratification has been accorded this normal, democratic procedure so that legislators may weigh the various arguments surrounding it. Those who claim that the consular pact is an ordinary and insignificant treaty are either unaware of its basic significance and thus would profit from such hearings or employ this contention to abet the possibility of a blind ratification. By all evidence the proponents of the pact have displayed a morbid fear of public hearings and wide discussion on the issue.

The evidence also shows quite clearly that an attempt was made toward the close of the last session of Congress to railroad the treaty through the Senate. Fortunately, the maneuver was thwarted by the alert action of numerous groups and individuals. For example, in a press release the National Captive Nations Committee called for "open and frank public hearings" on the convention and protested against "the maneuver of ramming this ill-advised and harmful treaty down the throats of our people without fair and open hearings."<sup>10</sup> Representative EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, of Illinois, performed an invaluable service in his persistent charges against the railroading of this treaty.<sup>11</sup> A striking editorial in one critical paper began "Details are now at hand concerning the swift railroad job, with Senator FULBRIGHT as chief engineer, which was done to get the Soviet Consular Treaty out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee some days ago."<sup>12</sup>

Not to have the maneuver appear too crude and arbitrary, the committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and several State Department associates. The committee print that followed contains all the marks of swift maneuver and haphazard publication. For example, the title of the pamphlet is "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," but on page 3 a caption reads "Consular Convention With Russia." If at this stage of American understanding the concepts of Soviet Union and Russia are held to be synonymous, then we are in real trouble with respect to some reasoning on this issue.

To mention another example among the many, the dialog between the chairman and Senator HICKENLOOPER makes for absorbing reading. In his opening statement Senator FULBRIGHT lets the cat out of the bag by stating "The committee met in executive session July 20, 1965, to consider the convention and decided at that time to take it up formally and submit it to the Senate for its advice and consent."<sup>13</sup> Sen-

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed background on this see Lev E. Dobriansky, "The Second Treaty of Moscow," CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Feb. 8, 1964, pp. 2119-2122.

<sup>2</sup> E. W. Kenworthy, "Rightists Oppose Pact With Soviet," the New York Times, Aug. 19, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> "The Consular Treaty," the Evening Star, Aug. 24, 1965.

<sup>4</sup> "Scared Off," editorial, the Washington Post, Aug. 23, 1965.

<sup>5</sup> Communications to chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mar. 10, 1964.

<sup>6</sup> "New Myths, Old Realities," editorial, the Richmond News Leader, Feb. 16, 1965.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., "No Hearings Set on United States-Soviet Consular Treaty," the Evening Star, Feb. 15, 1965.

<sup>8</sup> "Senators Delay Consular Pact With Russians," the Evening Star, July 12, 1965.

<sup>9</sup> "Hearings Due on Russian Consular Pact," the Washington Post, July 22, 1965.

<sup>10</sup> "FULBRIGHT Urged To Hold Open and Frank Hearings on Consular Convention," Aug. 3, 1965.

<sup>11</sup> E.g., William Moore, "DERWINSKI Hits Plan for Russ Consulates," Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1965.

<sup>12</sup> "Normal Relations," the Richmond News Leader, Aug. 13, 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Consular Convention With the Soviet Union, hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1965, p. 1.



ater HICKENLOOPER follows by stating, "I want to correct a misunderstanding. I understood you to say in the opening statement that the committee had decided to submit this to the Senate for confirmation."<sup>14</sup> Contrary to his opening statement, the chairman covers himself by replying "The committee would have to vote on it after we have had committee hearings." Then, in the print, the dialog is interrupted by the insertion of the President's message and the convention itself, and 15 pages later Senator FULBRIGHT further contradicts his original, plain statement by saying "We had decided to proceed with hearings if the committee so voted. That is what I meant to say."<sup>15</sup> His words scarcely reveal such meaning.

Despite much talk about hearings at this point, only one staged hearing was held. Secretary Rusk was heard on points emphasizing the protection Americans in the U.S.S.R. would receive, the little difference between this treaty and other consular conventions, the risks of espionage we have to assume in our open society, the inadequacies of our Embassy in Moscow, the need for normalizing relations, mutual understanding, the improvement of communications, and other equally vague generalities. As the writer stated in a letter criticizing one of our papers, "by virtue of his antiquated and misleading conceptions of the Soviet Union, which even the late Adlai E. Stevenson tactfully repudiated in November 1961, Secretary Rusk can scarcely be regarded as the sole, adequate witness."<sup>16</sup> These salient points in the Rusk testimony will be answered in the remaining reasons against the ratification of the treaty.

How much of all this was pitifully misinterpreted can be gleaned from this statement of a Senator supporting a blind ratification of the pact: "Those writers are ignorant of the fact that hearings were held."<sup>17</sup> The official publication of the committee is accurately titled "Hearing," but the Senator insists hearings, governmental or public, were held. He also believes the treaty is with Russia. Moreover, some verbal legerdemain was detected in the distinction drawn between the treaty and the actual opening of consulates.

According to the State Department, one shouldn't be too concerned with the treaty because "the question of opening consulates . . . will be the subject of separate negotiations."<sup>18</sup> Why then all these pressure tactics concerning the treaty's ratification? Actually, the formal and legal basis provided by the treaty is most essential to the question of opening consulates. It is also worth while to note the haste on the part of the Department in exacting appropriations from Congress for a consulate in Leningrad with several \$500 water coolers, extra bedrooms for single girl secretaries and what have you.<sup>19</sup>

Again, this first reason is reason enough to justify a rejection of the treaty. Its proponents apparently fear a full and open examination of it in the public forum. Without open, public hearings, a ratification of the pact would be an arbitrary and blind

one. The democratic staging of such hearings would necessitate thoughtful consideration for the nine remaining reasons.

## II. A DIPLOMATIC AFFIRMATION OF MOSCOW'S INNER EMPIRE

The second reason for rejecting the treaty is that it constitutes a diplomatic affirmation, a stamp of approval and acceptance of Moscow's inner empire. I'm aware of the fact that most Americans cling to the myth that the Soviet Union in Russia, that the U.S.S.R. is a country like ours, indeed, that this inner empire of many nations is a nation like ours. One superficial account of last August's episode misleads readers in this fashion, "If ratified, it would be the first bilateral treaty between the two nations."<sup>20</sup>

We can allow for such ignorance in an ordinary newspaper article, but for our leaders of state to believe that the U.S.S.R. is a nation is plainly unpardonable. If we should ever lose the cold war, it would be basically because of this fundamental gap in our understanding of the U.S.S.R. as an empire-state, a prison house of many captive nations, the inner and basic sphere of the present Soviet Russian Empire. Despite other objectives and purposes, both Napoleon and Hitler lost hot wars in this area of Eastern Europe because of substantially the same gap in understanding.

This fallacious notion of the U.S.S.R. as a "country" and other basic myths are reflected in the convention, which of course cannot but satisfy the propaganda and psychopolitical efforts of Moscow to the utmost. The treaty is founded on the mythical conception that the U.S.S.R. is a nation-state comparable in character to ours. American consulates in any of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. would tangibly reinforce this myth, needlessly abet Russian policies aimed at unifying this primary imperium, and thus nullify any leverage for peace we may have in at least recognizing the freedom goals of the captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R.

In the past 45 years the United States has committed many shortsighted errors bolstering and strengthening this inner empire of Soviet Russia. Ratification of this treaty would add another chapter to this sordid record. In a letter to Senator FULBRIGHT, the writer emphasized this point when he stated, "a blind ratification of the convention would form another chapter in our long, inept dealings with the Russians and expose us to the charge of being a nation of hypocrites when the President and others proclaim our 'devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.' This treaty is a confirmation of Russia's imperio-colonialism within the U.S.S.R. and further evidence of our diplomatic ineptitude in the cold war, not to say our grave lack of understanding of America's prime enemy."<sup>21</sup> In terms of power and ambition, we delude ourselves if we think Peiping rather than Moscow is the prime enemy.

Before taking action on the treaty it would profit each Senator to read a recent official study prepared for one of the Senate's own committees on the empire within the U.S.S.R. "Western scholars of Soviet affairs," it observes, "agree on the imperial-colonial character of the U.S.S.R."<sup>22</sup> Commendable as it is, even this study doesn't cover all aspects of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism in the U.S.S.R. For succinct, deep insights into this inner empire each Senator would do well to read Adlai Stevenson's remarkable memorandum on the subject in the

United Nations.<sup>23</sup> After reading these he would have to ask himself, "Could I as a Senator, representing people in a democracy and republic dedicated to principles of national independence and self-determination, vote for a treaty which explicitly and implicitly misrepresents a state and in effect places a stamp of approval on a tyrannical empire?" Each in his own conscience would have to answer this question.

This reason for not ratifying the treaty is basic to all others. It hinges on the most fundamental issue of the contemporary struggle—Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism versus freedom and national independence. It offers us another opportunity to fill in the gap of American understanding of the U.S.S.R. The first was Congress Captive Nations Week resolution (Public Law 86-90) in 1959, which for the first time recognized the freedom aspirations of all the captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Ratification of the treaty would contradict the very essence and spirit of that resolution. Also, Secretary Rusk and others argue that the treaty would improve communications between the two "countries."

Aside from the rudimentary fact that it is hardly within the purview of consular activity to communicate or negotiate between countries, what improvement in communications could be achieved between the United States and the many nations in the U.S.S.R. under a treaty which slights and ignores the presence of all but one of these nations? To our own detriment, the very opposite would be achieved.

## III. LEGAL INVALIDITIES OF THE TREATY

A third substantial reason for rejecting the treaty is its numerous legal invalidities. If some of our lawmakers in the Senate still find the second reason difficult to grasp at this point, surely the legal contradictions and invalidities of the pact would fall more readily within their immediate attention. In a court of law any patent misrepresentation of parties to a contract or blatant contradictions to fact would be sufficient to throw the case out of court. The consular treaty is pitted exactly in this situation.

Throughout the text of the treaty one rears about "a national of the sending state."<sup>24</sup> This makes sense in the case of the United States, a citizen of a nation generally called about the world "an American." Who is the national of the Soviet Union? A Russian, Lithuanian, Georgian and so forth? If language and words have any meaning, a "national" is an individual member of a given nation. On the impregnable basis of all evidence provided by Moscow itself, the Soviet Union is no nation but rather a so-called union of many nations. Legally, there is no such animal as a "Soviet national" other than a fictional image in the minds of some who wallow in the myths of the U.S.S.R. being a nation or anyone in the U.S.S.R.—worse still "Russia"—being a "Soviet," which is a council of workers and peasants.

Clearly, if some can extricate themselves from the unreasoned, semantic mess indicated here, they would begin to see that the convention contradicts the very essence of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, which though largely semantic is nonetheless a nominal compromise with the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. By this kind of misrepresentative language the pact violates also the authenticity of every official map of the U.S.S.R. and contradicts reams of official Moscow pronouncements on the multinational composition of the U.S.S.R. In their desire to reap

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> "Consular Convention With the U.S.S.R.," CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 19, 1965, pp. 20312-20313.

<sup>17</sup> "Proposed Consular Convention With Soviet Union More to Advantage of United States Than to Russia," Mr. Young of Ohio, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 17, 1965, p. 19838.

<sup>18</sup> John C. Guthrie, "Communication," May 14, 1964.

<sup>19</sup> "Daniel Rapaport," United Press International story, May 8, 1965.

<sup>20</sup> Murray Marder, "United States-Soviet Treaty," the Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1965.

<sup>21</sup> Communication, Aug. 4, 1965.

<sup>22</sup> The Soviet Empire, Committee on the Judiciary, 1965, p. 168.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Memorandum to U.N. delegations, the United Nations, Nov. 25, 1961.

<sup>24</sup> E.g., Consular Convention With the Soviet Union, p. 8, 9, 10, etc.

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the psychopolitical advantages of the treaty the Muscovite rulers would prostitute anything and, as in everything else, accuse the other party of the perversions. By allowing this to take place we exhibit our own psychopolitical immaturity.

Further examples of legal invalidity are, in the case of the Soviet Union, provisions for "the national flag of the sending state" and "the national coat of arms of the sending state."<sup>25</sup> Of course, in objective circumstance there is no such flag or coat of arms for the U.S.S.R. Each republic has its own flag and emblem. The flag and coat of arms of the U.S.S.R. shown at any Moscow-established consulate in the United States would be another perversion of fact permitted by the legal invalidity of the treaty.

Speaking of legalities, no one has raised the question of accumulated legacies left by Russian emigres and others in behalf of known or unknown parties in the Soviet Union. How many millions of dollars is colonialist Moscow seeking to acquire under article 10 of the treaty? The Russians are employing every trick, including "the economic independence of the satellites," to build up their stock of foreign currencies; the treaty is another means. It would be interesting to see what the Department of State can furnish on these accumulated legacies. Mr. Rusk and others vaguely argue that the pact would abet "mutual understanding." With whom? The imperio-colonialists in Moscow? What of the various nations and peoples in the U.S.S.R.? How would all these allowed perversions and open risks mold our bonds of mutual understanding with them? In the long run, they will prevail, not the ruling Russian totalitarians.

#### IV. AN AMERICAN ASSIST TO RUSSIFICATION

The fourth objection to the treaty is that its provisions engender an American assist to Russification within and outside the U.S.S.R. The provision in the pact for the use of the Russian language to process the fictitious Soviet national is in every sense an inadvertent assist to the well-known Russification policies of Moscow.<sup>26</sup> In effect, here too we would be buttressing Moscow's colonialist policy of enforcing the use of the captor's language among the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R.

Here, too, before he casts his vote on the treaty it would do well for each Senator to scan another recent congressional study on cultural Russification and linguicide in the U.S.S.R.<sup>27</sup> Do we want to be placed in the position of confirming and abetting this vicious genocidal tendency further? It is bad enough that functional necessity compels us to accede to it on the ambassadorial level, though this could be rectified, too, by a diplomatic alternative of a more realistic nature.

With a premium on verbal generality Mr. Rusk and others argue for the treaty because it would "normalize relations." What are they seeking to normalize? The inner Soviet Russian Empire, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, or Moscow's Russification policies? The treaty would abnormally relate us to these ugly phenomena in the seeming position of even accepting them as "normal." Aside from the essential factor of comparative advantage in the cold war, what a political posture we are asked to assume by ratify this treaty. The Nation of the American Revolution and all the perennial principles this implies is urged in the name of normalization to place stamps of diplo-

matic approval on the worst institutional hallmarks of its basic enemy. Also, what is most curious is that those who talk loudly today about "the liquidation of the Communist monolith," "growing nationalism in Eastern Europe," "a world of diversity," and "good Communists and bad ones" are normally those who, for whatever reasons, stop at the borders of the U.S.S.R., the determining inner empire itself, with these supposedly new notions.

#### V. THE VERY DIFFERENT DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The preceding three reasons for nonratification of the pact received far less attention last August than the next two. Yet in the broader context of understanding the contemporary struggle, its prime sources of tension and longrun dangers to world peace, they carry greater weight than the next two objections, which by themselves, of course, are adequate to justify nonratification. It is noteworthy how much more adept and knowledgeable the Chinese Reds are in utilizing essential facts concerning the inner Soviet Russian Empire, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, Moscow's Russification program, and the captive status of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. than we are.<sup>28</sup> Their ends are different, but they at least do not accommodate the Russian totalitarians in their worst features.

Contrary to the baseless contention that this consular convention is no different or is even slightly different from other conventions, the pact is very different not only in its relation to our prime enemy in the cold war but also in its incredible provision of diplomatic immunity to consular personnel for all crimes, including espionage.<sup>29</sup> It is sad enough that the treaty's assumptions and contents seriously deprecate our general political posture as a democratic free world leader, but this provision is an open invitation to Red subversion of our Nation.

Every other existing convention grants immunity only from punishment for misdemeanors. The reader can now understand why I entitled an article on this subject "The second treaty of Moscow." The pact was made to order—in Moscow. Even our allies don't enjoy this unprecedented consular privilege.

In view of the concentrated discussion on this point last August, it is unnecessary to belabor it further. Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, the State Department's legal adviser, admitted in unqualified terms that this immunity from criminal jurisdiction "is not present in other consular conventions to the same extent."<sup>30</sup> Mr. Meeker, who is under the illusion that some "Soviet national" animal exists, tried to moderate the immunity provision by pointing out that it "will extend only to those consular officers and employees who are agreed to by the two governments."<sup>31</sup> As though in actual practice this would make any significant difference.

The views expressed by opponents to the treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are quite firm on this immunity provision.<sup>32</sup> Publicized discussion of the point led many to the conclusion which one Senator put in these words: "It is this last section that is inimical with the best interests of the United States. It is the last section that clearly indicates that this convention was negotiated by the Soviets, not as a bilateral pact for improving Soviet-American relations, but as a cold war maneuver to

enhance and expand the intelligence gathering network of the U.S.S.R."<sup>33</sup>

Mr. Rusk and others argue that the treaty would offer greater protection for Americans touring and visiting in the U.S.S.R. This protection argument, covering some 12,000 Americans annually, is supposed to counterbalance the lapse in it as concerns the immunity provision. Much is made of the notification and access provisions regarding arrests. Actually, this so-called Russian concession should have been demanded long ago on the purely ambassadorial level, and should be so demanded on the simple principle of reciprocity. U.S.S.R. representatives and tourists are accorded the privileges and benefits of our democratic criminal code; pure reciprocal relations would demand the same for our people. To hook the notification and access provisions as a notable Russian "concession" to the consular treaty indicates that our negotiators had already walked into the bear trap. It is as much a concession as a thief giving up stolen property.

#### VI. INTENSIFIED POLITICAL WARFARE IN THE UNITED STATES

Espionage was the leading word for the next popular objection to the treaty last August. Our FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, was quoted at length in support of this criticism. In earlier testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. Hoover had emphasized that U.S.S.R. "consulates in many parts and the country \* \* \* will make our work more difficult."<sup>34</sup> A later statement by him stressed the following: "One Soviet intelligence officer in commenting on the agreement spoke of the wonderful opportunity this presented his service and that it would enable the Soviets to enhance their intelligence operations."<sup>35</sup> So effective were these points that the President subsequently issued a directive to officials to support administration policies, aiming it particularly at Hoover.<sup>36</sup>

There are several aspects to this sixth reason for nonratification that need some clarification. First, though public hearings were barred, it obviously behooved the Foreign Relations Committee to invite Mr. Hoover, as another Government witness, to testify on the pact. Surely he is far more qualified to discuss the likely espionage effects of the treaty than is Secretary Rusk. Second, it is certainly no strain on one's imagination to envisage the expanded opportunities for Soviet Russian espionage with consulates ranging cross-country from New York to Chicago and San Francisco.

However, considering the huge spy apparatus now maintained by Moscow in this country, one can rationally allow for only a relatively small increase in overall effectiveness with the presence of consulates. The economic law of diminishing return applies in this field as in others. Doubtless the establishment of consulates would make Hoover's work more difficult, but it is doubtful that the condition as concerns espionage activity would be unmanageable. Moreover, as I argued elsewhere, spying is a two-way street. On the other hand, since alternatives for different diplomatic arrangements exist, there is no reason whatsoever to accommodate the Russians in this risky respect.

Especially is this so when a broader view is taken of Soviet Russian activity in this country. The problem entails more than just espionage. It can best be described as one of intensified political warfare, signs of which have already appeared in civil rights

<sup>25</sup> See "Sino-Soviet Border Potential Powder Keg," the Ukrainian Bulletin, New York, Apr. 1-15, 1965, p. 35.

<sup>26</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," p. 12.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 34-35.

<sup>29</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," minority views, Aug. 10, 1965.

<sup>30</sup> Senator NORRIS COTTON, "The Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 21185.

<sup>31</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," minority views, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> "L.B.J. Policy Edict Tied to Hoover," the Washington Post, Aug. 21, 1965.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>36</sup> See "Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the U.S.S.R.," study of population and immigration problems, House Committee on the Judiciary, 1964.

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riots, campus agitation, peace demonstrations, overt U.S.S.R. Embassy propaganda on the Watts riot," and a variety of actions striking against civil and political authority. Strategically situated consulates would not only be additional spy nests but also active sources of conspiracy, propaganda, blackmail, and intimidation against those with relatives in the Red Empire, and media for undermining ethnic and other anti-Communist groups. With the type of immunity offered them, they should make bold efforts along these lines.

Mr. Rusk and others talk glibly about our "open society" and the espionage risks we have to take. They fail to see the broader problem involved here with long-arm ramifications extending to our actions in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and almost everywhere else. Regarding espionage solely, a more naive observation by the Secretary cannot be found than when he testified, "I do hope that the Convention will reduce misunderstandings and particularly be of assistance in not letting private citizens, tourists, businessmen, exchange people, and others get caught up in the atmosphere in which this other type of problem arises."<sup>11</sup> Protected into the future, this type of uncritical thinking would virtually guarantee the closing of our open society.

#### VII. BASIS FOR INTENSIFIED POLITICAL WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA

Speaking of ramifications emerging from a shortsighted ratification of the treaty, the next four reasons for nonratification indicate what we can expect from this further appeasement of Soviet Russian desires. It should be evident now to the reader that all of these reasons against ratification are integrally related, though any one is sufficient cause for rejecting the treaty. To the recurring distinction made between the treaty as a body of guidelines for consular activity and the actual establishment of the consulates, which some even suggest the State Department might act upon devoid of any treaty, one can reasonably maintain the virtual inseparability of the two and the political certainty of no consulates if these many reasons, individually, in combination or as an integral whole, lead to a Senate rejection of the pact.

Thus, the seventh reason for nonratification is that a Senate confirmation of this treaty would open up a Pandora's box of Soviet Russian pressure against every free government in Latin America. The immediate objective would be similar consular conventions; the ultimate objective would be a really intensified political warfare in the area. This at a time when many of our own officials have been warning us to expect stepped-up Red subversion throughout the continent.

Strangely enough, this reason against ratification was scarcely brought up in the August discussion. Few even knew that as of now no U.S.S.R. consulates exist in the Western Hemisphere. In a cogent rebuttal to a newspaper editorial, Congressman Derwinski stated the case eloquently: "Acquiescence of the United States to Soviet consulates would set an obvious precedent that would soon find the Communist rulers of Moscow spreading their influence in Latin America by means of consular activities. What Latin American government could refuse the request for a consulate after the leader of the free world has extended this benefit to the rulers of the Kremlin?"<sup>12</sup>

Need more be said on this point of consular proliferation for extended Red subversion in the Western Hemisphere? The ratification of the treaty would create a solid basis for intensified Russian political warfare in Latin America. As in the area of trade with the Red Empire, our lack of firm and consistent policy will be another government's rationalization for its actions under pressure.

#### VIII. A TRADE WEDGE

Another reason for not ratifying the pact is the obvious use made of this treaty as a diplomatic wedge to liberalize and increase trade with the Soviet Union and the Red empire in general. Time and time again in his testimony Mr. Rusk spoke of the prospect of "increasing trade between our two countries."<sup>13</sup> At times it appears this argument of dollars and cents carried more weight with him than the argument of humane protection for Americans in the U.S.S.R.

The issue of increased trade with the U.S.S.R. and the Red empire is a controversial problem in and of itself. This writer has pointed out in testimony and in emphatic terms that any such liberalized trade would not be the first time the United States has contributed myopically to the economic strengthening of the Soviet Russian Empire—always, of course, in the interests of "peace," "normal relations," "relaxation of tensions," and other self-legitimations.<sup>14</sup> Up to now those seeking such East-West trade have been careful to distinguish between our trading more liberally with the captive states in central Europe and that with the U.S.S.R. The former is supposed to unclench these Red totalitarian states from the chains of Russian domination, though for years Moscow itself has pursued the empire policy of division of national labor.

Now, curiously enough, we see Secretary Rusk injecting the trade issue into this consular one with evident abandon of the distinction mentioned above. Our fighting men in South Vietnam should take great comfort in this switch since economic trade support of the U.S.S.R. should in turn bolster Moscow's support of Hanoi for an even more challenging conflict in that area.

The fragmented policy of our government conduces to many blatant contradictions. This tactic of arguing for the treaty on the basis of trade prospects which in turn would facilitate the economic means of Moscow's global cold war operations against our interests is a gem of policy making fragmentations. It's cause enough to reject the treaty as a trade wedge.

#### IX. THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION SIEVE

As in the area of trade with the Red Empire, the most-favored-nation sieve exists in consular agreements. This ninth reason for not ratifying the treaty was emphasized by several scrutinizing Senators who wisely oppose the extension of the immunity privilege to twenty-seven other nations and states, including Yugoslavia and Rumania.<sup>15</sup> As they pointed out, as many as 400 consular personnel would be eligible under the treaty and their covering conventions with the most-favored-nation clause for immunity from prosecution for all crimes.

On this point Secretary Rusk affirmed that "others would have the right to raise with us establishing various privileges, but only on a basis of reciprocity."<sup>16</sup> It is interesting that this concern for reciprocity shows itself

here but not with the protection of American citizens in the U.S.S.R. on the ambassadorial or full diplomatic level. With this sieve the risks mentioned earlier become all the more magnified. Also, Red governments with no consular agreements at present would seek the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause in any future conventions.

The snowball effects of the treaty's provisions are thus not difficult to determine. They all point to a substantial net disadvantage for us. Recently, for example, our officials have uttered some tart remarks with regard to Japan's apathy toward the Vietnam war and its warm behavior toward the Red empire. Encouraged by our action, Japan, too, is on the road to signing a consular agreement with the U.S.S.R.<sup>17</sup> If in short time it judges the U.S.S.R. to be a far greater threat to the free world than Red China could possibly be in the next decade, it would have a self-legitimizing basis for establishing similar and probably closer relations with Peiping.

#### X. THE BALTIC DILEMMA

A final reason for nonratification bears on the Baltic dilemma to which the treaty exposes us. This reason is logically a derivative of the second reason we considered, as well as being based on an act of U.S. policy. The United States does not recognize the forced incorporation of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia in the U.S.S.R. Yet, despite the silent treatment proffered by the State Department's legal counsel, any consular activity in these republics cannot but in practice and in time constitute de facto recognition.<sup>18</sup> With the allowable establishment of consular districts there, this condition would become crystal clear. At least Secretary Rusk admitted, "We do have a bit of a dilemma there, Senator."<sup>19</sup>

In conclusion, there are many dilemmas, contradictions, and risks posed by this consular convention. From Moscow's viewpoint, as an instrument of the cold war it is fraught with innumerable advantages—imperial legitimacy, propaganda, legacies, political warfare penetrations, espionage and so forth. Our viewpoint is already so belated that many cannot see a real diplomatic alternative to this disadvantageous arrangement which would satisfy most of the reasons given for ratification of the convention, including the inadequacy of our Embassy in Moscow, and yet realize a substantial net advantage.

Before alternatives can be examined, the treaty itself should be subjected to full, critical examination. This has not as yet been done. The question is a simple one: blind ratification or open, public hearings?

[From the Arizona Republic, Mar. 16, 1966]

#### THE PEOPLE SPEAK: CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE OPPOSES CONSULAR TREATY

EDITOR, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC:

Americans have generally met whatever demands have been made of them for their survival and the survival of their allies. They have performed well on the battlefields, but, sad to say, around diplomatic tables, they seem never to have learned anything.

In application of open force they are masters; in the use of threat of force, feeble amateurs. They simply cannot understand that being a "good Joe" is viewed by some as a reflection of cowardice and weakness.

In our dealings with the Soviets, we have tried to appease them repeatedly with no measure of success but we continue. We tried communication through various conference tables of neutrals, still no success. We invent new means of communication, propose

<sup>11</sup> "Top Soviet Intellectuals Castigate United States on Riots," the Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1965.

<sup>12</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," p. 29.

<sup>13</sup> Edward J. Derwinski, "The Consular Treaty," the Evening Star, Washington, D.C., Aug. 27, 1965.

<sup>14</sup> E.g., "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> Lev E. Dobriansky, "Five Perspectives on East-West Trade," East-West Trade, hearings, pt. II, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1965, pp. 94-104.

<sup>16</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," minority views, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> "Japan, Russia Are Negotiating," Reuters, Moscow, June 10, 1965.

<sup>19</sup> "Consular Convention With the Soviet Union," p. 26.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 25.



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"hot lines" and grant consular privileges not available to our friendliest ally—but we wonder, if problems of communication occur, are they not caused by the Soviets' determination not to listen.

Inside our own country we scold ourselves for not permitting a Communist to attack us viciously for to do so would violate his constitutional rights. Strangely we haven't asked ourselves when a Communist has ever exercised any responsibility to preserving that Constitution. More generally he says the Constitution must go as well as the moral concepts of our various religious establishments.

The consular treaty is a rehashing of old ideas each of which has failed in the past—unilateral communication and appeasement. What sort of idiot would permit criminal immunity to the Kremlin butchers, permit the expansion of Red subversion which adds to the load of the already overworked FBI, to advance a condition whereby our citizens may be intimidated by threatening their loved ones in a captive nation? How can we allow a network of Soviet consulates to cover us from New York to Los Angeles and not expect at least one consulate in each Latin American Republic?

It takes little imagination to observe the obvious advantage to the Reds, in their crusade for world domination. These items of Senator FULBRIGHT's sponsored consular convention treaty. A stranger could wonder with a reasonable basis whether Senator FULBRIGHT and Dean Rusk have an allegiance beyond their country and constituents.

Still one cloudy point more—the treaty mentions U.S.S.R. and Soviet Russia. We are indeed in trouble if we assume they are one and the same. The Soviet Union includes many nations held captive in a large prison by Soviet Russia—are each of these to be represented? If so, does this mean a final burial of all these small nations and that this burial receive the official acceptance and approval of the United States?

We do not question the patriotism of our citizens, nor their fortitude, nor their willingness to accept adversity and sacrifice. We do observe apathy and slumber. This is dangerously a weakness to which Communists have been alerted for many years. They have used it with skill and persistence and with tremendous success.

No one expects all of us to be crusaders for freedom nor superpatriots nor to assume the same risks as the men in Vietnam at this time but it might not be a bad idea. We do plead with you to arouse yourself from apathy and slumber and to review your responsibilities.

We have a suitable petition protesting the consular convention treaty with many signatures already. If you readers, and especially parents of servicemen, would care to join us, please add your name to our petition. This petition is presented for signature at the Ameriactn Legion, 364 North Seventh Avenue, at the blue room at 8 p.m., Thursday, March 17, by the Captive Nations Committee. If unable to come, please mail us a post card stating:

"I am against the United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention Treaty." Your signature and address.

Mail your post card to National Captive Nations Committee, Arizona Branch, 2522 West Highland, Phoenix, Ariz.

WALTER CHOPIWSKY,  
President, Arizona Branch,  
National Captive Nations Committee.

(Mr. BRAY (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BRAY'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## THE FUTURE OF THE POTOMAC

(Mr. MATHIAS (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, March 25, many Marylanders joined me in celebrating the 332d anniversary of the founding of Maryland.

As we reviewed the past, present, and future of our great State, it seemed especially appropriate this year for us to focus our attention on the great Potomac River Basin, for the beauty and resources of the Potomac, and the strength and industry of the people of the basin, have nourished and invigorated Maryland throughout its history.

The wealth of the Potomac Basin is diverse and durable—but we have recognized that it is not indestructible. We have recognized the tremendous problems which threaten its land and water—and we have pledged ourselves to a great conservation effort, to preserve the basin's riches for future generations.

This year we must decide whether our pledge is to be simply repeated, or truly renewed.

For many years, dedicated groups and individuals have worked to protect specific segments of the basin, to develop particular recreation areas and facilities, and to promote their intelligent and compassionate use. Countless friends of the C. & O. Canal have fought for more than 15 years to restore that historic waterway and rescue it from neglect. In this decade, interest in basin water supply has expanded from relatively isolated pockets of concern to comprehensive consultation and debate. Finally, on February 8, 1965, President Johnson gave national importance to our regional efforts by declaring that the Potomac "should serve as a model of scenic and recreational values for the entire country."

Like many others, I welcomed the President's pledge, and endorsed the full commitment of Federal talents and resources which that pledge implied.

Now a year has passed, and much has been accomplished. The four Potomac Basin States and the District of Columbia have established effective channels of cooperation through the Governors' Advisory Committee. The Federal Interdepartmental Task Force and four subtask forces have been set to work. An interim report has been produced, and proposals more detailed and technical than those of the interim report are now being developed.

But I wish that more momentum had been gained. I wish that Federal concentration on the Potomac had been more constant, and that Federal emphasis on Potomac planning as a "model for the Nation" had not appeared more rhetorical than real.

I wish that the President, in his message to Congress this year on pollution and conservation, had been able to give a report on Potomac progress, rather than mentioning the river only in passing.

If the President's promise of 1965 is

to be renewed in 1966, the following steps should be taken at once:

First. Qualified personnel within the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Water Pollution Control Administration, and the Corps of Engineers should be formally assigned full-time to Potomac Basin planning. No matter how talented and dedicated the public servants involved, a full-scale Federal effort cannot be made with part-time help.

Second. Energetic and openminded consultation between Federal and State agencies and private organizations and groups involved in Potomac projects should be greatly expanded, and formal means to continue liaison and information sharing should be established. The development of truly comprehensive programs for this region requires all the information and imagination we can bring to bear—and many private groups and organizations possess deep knowledge of and experience with basin problems, knowledge, and experience too important to be ignored or overlooked, and too extensive to be duplicated without great waste of Federal energies.

Third. An active, candid public education and consultation program should be initiated throughout the basin by the Federal task force without delay. Although many excellent public discussions have been organized by private groups, it is essential that the Federal Government's interest in full public participation be more directly and vividly expressed. The residents of the basin, whose support will determine the success of any plan, should be encouraged now to become full, informed partners in planning.

Perhaps the most important product of our efforts in the year since the President's message is that we have learned how much we have to do—and how extensively we must cooperate in doing it.

Significant steps have been taken toward developing the basin's full recreational potential. The apparent agreement not to build a high dam at Seneca at this time is most welcome, and should end an unfortunate preoccupation with that one aspect of Potomac plans. The completion of State outdoor recreation plans under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act brings us closer to the actual development of sites and improvement of facilities in many parts of the basin. The full mapping of trails is another vital advance.

But the hard questions still lie before us. We have not yet defined, or even fully and publicly discussed, the types of policies required to insure that increasingly valuable lands along the main stem of the Potomac and around its tributaries will remain open for public enjoyment in years to come.

The concept of a comprehensive Potomac Valley Park is bold, sweeping, exciting—and vague. It seems clear that cost alone would prohibit massive Federal land acquisitions in the valley, so that federally owned park lands will be confined to selected acreage and the central strand of the C. & O. Canal. It also seems clear that the States cannot bear the burdens of acquiring all re-

maining acreage within this park. We will need full local cooperation in employing new tools, including scenic easements and protective zoning. These techniques cannot be evolved and accepted without extensive study, without thorough public discussion, and without amiable, continuing consultation between Federal and State officials and the officials and individuals of counties, cities, and towns. Federal efforts to encourage discussions—starting now—would help to prevent crises of communication later.

One difficulty which will become more and more obtrusive in the near future is the dependence of recreational development upon the resolution of water supply and water quality problems. Obviously parks cannot be shaped around reservoirs until the reservoirs have been built, nor can swimming, boating, and fishing areas be completed until water of suitable quality has been secured. Water remains the central challenge of Potomac planning.

In mapping our campaign against Potomac Basin water pollution, we should not forget that tactical questions, such as the location of dams and the size of treatment works, cannot be answered until strategic problems have been resolved. The continuing controversies over many basic issues suggest that our definition of strategy may still be hampered by a lack of knowledge of the causes of pollution.

Laymen can learn the outlines of Potomac pollution problems—the complexity of rural and urban, chemical and organic sources—the particular challenges of sedimentation. But even skilled engineers and scientists do not yet know enough. An intensive basin-wide research effort should be systematically pursued, with coordinated efforts being made by Federal agencies, private organizations, universities, and industry.

I had hoped that the President, while recommending expanded water quality research in his message on pollution and conservation, would suggest a model research program specifically for the Potomac Basin.

I had hoped that he would place greater emphasis on the problems of sedimentation.

I was disappointed that he did not emphasize the contributions to pollution research and prevention which can be made by enlightened industry, and did not advocate tax incentives to encourage industrial construction of adequate waste treatment works. While the threat of strong legal action may compel industries to comply with water quality standards, I believe that only more positive approaches will bring business and industry effectively and beneficially into the conservation partnership.

Above all, I regret that the President chose not to emphasize the staggering financial investment which must be made, on all levels of government, if any major rivers—much less all of them—are to be cleaned up and kept clean.

It may not be possible in this decade to allocate to water quality control as many billions as will have to be spent if

the whole job is to be done. It is possible, however, to make more effective use of available funds by redistributing the cost burdens involved. Eliminating unrealistic ceilings on Federal participation in waste treatment projects is one constructive step. Authorizing Federal matching of State contributions, up to a total Federal investment of perhaps 60 percent of total cost, could also ease the financial problems of many communities. Such an advance would also encourage substantial State participation in projects with direct or indirect statewide benefits.

Given the limitations of funds and—more important—of our knowledge, we should recognize that comprehensive solutions to pollution problems cannot be reached, or even drafted, at once. It seems important, therefore, to develop realistic interim priorities—to meet the most urgent needs for increased water supply, to begin action in those areas where delay could be most costly, and to reduce delays in recreational and other development projects dependent on water quality and supply improvements. All these projects should be analyzed and assessed, and priorities set, not in closed councils but in open, candid consultation among Federal and State planners, legislators, administrators, local officials, and—above all—the people whose lives will be affected and whose tax dollars will support the work.

We all face a tremendous challenge, the challenge of shaping our own progress and employing our own talents to secure the future of the great region in which we live. No single plan, no matter how comprehensive, can be more than a guide—and we should be sure that the guidelines which we follow are sound and clearly understood. At this point, we should encourage skepticism, criticism and debate. For if it seems that all our questions have been answered, then we have not asked all the right questions, or have not asked them in all possible arenas.

Each of us now has particular responsibilities. The Federal Government, having assumed formal leadership in Potomac planning, must exert that leadership in fact. State officials, having recognized how much they can do in concert, must also recognize how little public servants can do without full public understanding and support. Local officials, having grasped the need for planning, must further expand formal and informal communication among themselves and with other levels of government. Private organizations must assert themselves in areas of their special competence.

Above all, residents of the basin must exercise their right to seek information, to ask questions, and to ask more questions. And no one should wait for formal invitations before becoming involved.

The Potomac Basin is a mighty region—rich in history, strong in resources, unique in beauty—combining wilderness and towns, open country and crowded metropolitan areas. To preserve this basin is a mighty task, requiring a new breadth of insight and a new depth of cooperation among all who care.

Some of the controversies which have already enlivened our planning will be with us for a long time—and some should be. But we should not shrink from creative conflicts, just as we should not be timid in seeking agreement, or in acting when and where informed agreement has been reached. For we will never have a greater opportunity than we have this year, when the Potomac's meaning is in our hearts and its future is squarely in our hands.

(Mr. MOORE (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MOORE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

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[Mr. MOORE'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. BELL (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BELL'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mrs. DWYER (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend her remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mrs. DWYER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

#### ADDITION TO LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to advise the House of an addition to the program.

Tomorrow H.R. 5147, amending the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Act, will be called up, and it will probably be the first order of business tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. QUIE] is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. QUIE addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

#### LIBRARY SERVICES AND CONSTRUCTION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1966

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] is recognized for 10 minutes.